Washington-Miami-Havana 1999-2009: Towards the End of a Ménage à Trois? by Vagnoux, Isabelle











European Association for American Studies
 
Electronic reference
Isabelle Vagnoux, « Washington-Miami-Havana 1999-2009: Towards the End of a Ménage à Trois? », 
European journal of American studies [Online], 4-2 | 2009, document 1, Online since 20 September 2009,
connection on 01 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/7623  ; DOI : 10.4000/
ejas.7623 
This text was automatically generated on 1 May 2019.
Creative Commons License
Washington-Miami-Havana 1999-2009:




1 Just as Cuban Americans are the best represented Latinos in U.S.  politics and foreign
policy making, Cuba “has long occupied more space in the minds of U.S. policy makers
than it has on any map.”1 As early as 1823 Secretary of State John Quincy Adams predicted
the following: 
There are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple severed
by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but fall  to the ground, Cuba,
forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of
self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which by the
same law of nature cannot cast her off from its bosom.2
2 The gravitation metaphor has been used by politicians more than once. In the words of
the Cuban American historian Louis A. Pérez: 
Through the power of their own metaphors, the Americans had rendered the need
to  possess  Cuba  as  essential  to  the  well-being  of  the  North  American  Union.
Possession of Cuba was perceived to be inevitable as it was indispensable.3 
3 The relation with Cuba—and the clout exerted by its exiles—has to be understood in the
light  of  the  U.S.  ideology  of  “benevolent  domination”4 and of  this  historical,  almost
umbilical interest, although the United States never officially possessed the island. On
both sides of the Florida Straits, psychology, emotion and ideology have always been as
important as purely strategic interests.
4 From a European perspective,  realpolitik should have dictated a return to normalized
relations between the United States and Cuba after the end of the Cold War, the collapse
of  the Soviet  Union and the subsequent end of  the nearest  communist  threat to the
United States. After all, several Administrations did attempt to explore the normalization
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of relations with the island in the 1960s and 1970s and relations were fully normalized
with other communist countries such as China and Vietnam.5 It is difficult to imagine
what kind of strategic threat Cuba could now represent for its superpower neighbor. And
yet,  an array of  domestic factors and intermestic (i.e.  both international  and domestic)
interests continue to have a major voice in the shaping of this anachronistic “Politics-
Driven Policy”6 and “anomaly”7 which has prevailed over diplomacy and international
relations strategy. Cuban Americans, their political weight in Florida,8 their wealth and
donations, the merging of their private interests (the demise of the Castro rule) with
Washington’s public policy (the Cold War and the fear of an antagonistic regime so close
to the U.S. shore), the power of emotion, and the convenience of a pre-determined policy
on both sides of the Florida Straits, all account for the continuation of the embargo and
the staunch hostility towards the Castro brothers. Now, with a new Administration in
office, the widespread recognition that this policy has failed and isolated the U.S. in the
hemisphere,  and a demographic and ideological reshuffle within the Cuban American
community, will this improbable “ménage à trois”9 survive much longer?
 
2. Elián: The Turning Point
5 Many observers agree that the Elián episode undermined Albert Gore in the 2000 election
and  contributed  to  weakening  the  clout  of  the  powerful  Cuban  American  National
Foundation (CANF) which, from its creation in 1981 under the Reagan Administration’s
aegis, had up to then influenced most punitive U.S. decisions and measures toward Cuba.
Elián González was a Cuban boy who fled Cuba for Florida on a raft with his mother and
was rescued in high waters by Cuban Americans after his mother had disappeared into
the sea. That was in the fall of 1999, and the story unfolded through 2000. What initially
was a family tragedy turned into a political affair and a stake in the presidential election.
Who were the protagonists? On the one hand, the Miami Cuban American community,
supported by the CANF and the two Cuban American congressional representatives, who
went out of their way to keep Elián in Miami, once his mother’s family had been given
custody of him by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). On the other hand,
there was the Cuban government that made Elián a hero and fully supported the boy’s
father in his attempts to get him back. In the middle was the Clinton Administration,
which had to  solve  the issue and which did follow what  a  majority  of  U.S.  citizens,
Democrats and Hispanics said; that is, the boy had to be returned to his father, his only
living parent (hence Attorney General Janet Reno’s decision to take the child away from
Miami by force).  But Vice-President and presidential  candidate Albert  Gore was fully
aware that this move would make him very unpopular in Miami in an election year, with
Florida being one of the crucial ‘swing states’. He consequently made an improbable offer:
while Elián’s father was in Washington, under Cuban guard, to get his son back, Gore
offered him the option of staying in the United States with Elián. This sounded like a
compromise, achieving family reunion but on U.S. (free) soil, but it was an offer that Mr.
González, by this time a well-known figure in Cuba, could not possibly accept. This last-
chance attempt to save the Cuban American vote miserably failed. 
6 At the same time, if the Elián affair cemented the Miami Cuban American community, it
also sent to the rest of the country and to other Latinos a very negative and aggressive
image of this ‘exile’ group which may have pushed some to become more vocal for an
opening-up of dialogue with Cuba. This marked the end of the hard-line CANF stance, a
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decline that had already started with the death of its leader Jorge Mas Canosa in 1997, and
with the Pope’s call to end the embargo during his visit to Cuba in1998. A decisive turning
point was reached in 2001 when Mas’s son, Jorge Mas Santos, dared speak of dialogue with
Cuba, a decision that was viewed as an act of high treason by the more radical members of
the  community.  Along with radio  host  Ninoska Pérez  Castellón,  twenty  of  the  CANF
directors decided to resign. In the aftermath, the hard-line Cuban Liberty Council (2001)
and  U.S.-Cuba  Democracy  Political  Action  Committee  (2003)  were  established.  Now
challenged by these more radical actors, the Foundation never retrieved its former clout,
becoming more diverse in membership and closer to the Democratic party as a result. 
 
3. Catering to the Cuban American Galaxy
3.1. George W. Bush’s ‘thank you’ to the Cuban American
Community
7 It is an open secret that G.W. Bush owes a great deal to Cuban Americans in South Florida
(he received 80 percent of their vote in 2000), to the former governor of Florida (his own
brother Jeb, named the “first Cuban American governor” by Senator Mel Martinez) and
the Republican-controlled institutions of the state. Jeb Bush’s own political alliances with
the  more  radical  elements  of  the  Cuban  American  community  (particularly  the  U.S.
Representatives Ros Lehtinen and Díaz Balart) undoubtedly influenced his brother’s hard-
line  policies  toward  Cuba.  Cuban  Americans  got  prominent  positions  in  the
Administration: Carlos Gutierrez as Secretary of Commerce; Mel Martinez as Secretary of
Housing and then as the first Hispanic Chairman of the Republican National Committee,
before he resigned in the fall of 2007; Emilio Gonzalez as director of the INS; Eduardo
Aguirre as Ambassador to Spain; Adolfo Franco at the head of the AID Cuba Program
(along with Ambassador Reich, Franco subsequently became one of presidential candidate
John McCain’s campaign advisors on Latin America). Last but not least, Ambassador Otto
Reich was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America. Not confirmed by
Congress, he could only have a one-year recess appointment. He subsequently became the
special  envoy  of  the  President  until  mid-2004.  A  hard-liner  on  Cuba,  he  largely
contributed to shaping the policy towards the Castro regime. Clearly, for a group that
represents 0.5 percent of  the U.S.  population and 3.6 percent of  all  Hispanics,  Cuban
Americans were overrepresented, especially in the first Bush Administration. 
 
3.2 “Hastening the democratic transition in Cuba”
8 After  9/11  one  of  the  cornerstones  of  the  Bush  Administration  was  the  defense  of
‘freedom’  throughout  the  world.  This  perfectly  echoed  the  Cuban  Americans’  own
crusade. The emphasis on human rights violations, which had replaced the communist
threat in the 1990s, now came to occupy the center of the White House’s Cuban policy. A
hard line policy could now be launched against “our hemisphere’s only dictatorship”.10 A
CIA mission manager was established to collect intelligence on Cuba and Venezuela, and
the Administration decided to increase foreign aid to dissident groups within Cuba.
9 The creation of a Cabinet-level Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) in 2003,
“a commission to explore ways in which the United States can help hasten and ease a
democratic transition in Cuba”, was another administrative token to the Cuban American
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community, particularly in Florida. Prompted by Ambassador Otto Reich, the idea behind
the establishment  of  the Commission was that  Cuba was vulnerable,  opening up the
opportunity  to  give  the final  blow and end the 45-year-old communist  regime.  As  a
consequence it was necessary to be prepared for when things finally changed in Cuba.
According to Reich it would require a “Marshall Plan for Cuba as infrastructure will have
to be completely overhauled.”11The Commission was a purely executive product, not born
from a piece of  legislation,  with the aim to guide the administration’s  policy.  It  was
reminiscent both of the “transition program” drafted by the CANF in 1993, in the wake of
the Soviet Union’s collapse, and of the Cuban Transition Committee chaired by Jeb Bush
in  Florida  in  1995  to  “produce  step-by-step  instruction  on  how  exactly  to  establish
democracy  in  Cuba.”12 Title  II,  Section  202  (g)  of  the  Cuban Liberty  and Democratic
Solidarity Act (Helms Burton Act) compelled the President “not later than 180 days after”
the Act was enacted to “transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
describing in detail the plan developed” by the Assistance for the Cuban People section.13
Complying wih the law the Clinton White House compiled a report entitled Support for a
Democratic Transition in Cuba. In other words, the Bush Administration’s CAFC appeared
as the latest vehicle for Cuban American attempts to shape Cuba’s future.
10 The first Commission report, published in 2004—a presidential campaign year when it
was  necessary  to  court  both  Cuban  American  voters  and  donors—welcomed  “an
expeditious  end  to  Castro’s  rule”  and  emphasized  six  major  goals:  hastening  Cuba’s
transition; meeting basic human needs in health, education, housing and human services;
establishing democratic institutions, respect for human rights, rule of law, and national
justice  and  reconciliation;  establishing  the  core  institutions  of  a  free  economy;
modernizing  infrastructure;  identifying  and  addressing  environmental  degradation.
Although  the  “selected  recommendations”  were  carefully  worded  with  diplomatic
caution to avoid giving the impression of outright interference (“as the Cuban people
desire,”  “assuming  the  new  Cuban  government  desires  it,”  “assuming  a  free  Cuban
government  agreed,”  “if  requested  by  a  transition  government,”),14 the  2004  report
provided the U.S. government and the international community with a roadmap for what
should be done to “assist a free Cuba.” Appointed in 2005 to “accelerate the demise of
Castro’s tyranny,”15the Cuba Transition Coordinator, Caleb C. McCarry, later emphasized
that: 
we  will  do  all  this  and  more,  provided  we  are  asked  by  a  Cuban  transition
government that is committed to dismantling all instruments of state repression
and  implementing  internationally  respected  human  rights  and  fundamental
freedoms.16
11 In the face of the outcry and accusations of interference this initiative caused in Latin
America  and  even  among  Cuban  dissidents—the  Chilean  Secretary  General  of  the
Organization  of  American  States,  José  Miguel  Insulza,  even  quipped  “there  is  no
transition and it is not your country”17—another report, chaired by Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice and Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez, was released in 2006. It
recognized the efforts of civil society in Cuba and recommended steps to “hasten the end
of  the  Castro  dictatorship:  transition  not  succession,”  while  insisting  that  the  U.S.
government “will need to be prepared well in advance in the event the Cuban Transition
government  requests  assistance.”18 Caleb  McCarry  further  “offer[ed]”  “advice  and
assistance to all who seek democratic change in Cuba” and ensured that “when asked, we
will be able to offer appropriate support that meets needs identified by Cubans.”19 At the
same time,  the Bush Administration relentlessly requested the U.N.  condemnation of
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Cuba for  violating human rights  and categorized Cuba as  a  ‘rogue state’  and a state
sponsor  of  terrorism,  a  posture  recently  denounced  by  Richard  Clarke,  the  U.S.
Coordinator  for  counterterrorism  in  both  the  Clinton  and  George  W.  Bush
Administrations, who affirmed that Cuba has not been a state sponsor of terrorism at
least since the late 1990’s.20 
12 The Commission’s recommendations and criticisms failed to obtain the desired effects
and  to  fulfill  its  self-ascribed  mission.  Waiting  for  the  “transition”  to  happen,  it
concentrated on meeting with European and Latin American groups and partners  to
discuss  how  to  move  Cuba  toward  the  kind  of  democracy  they  would  want,  and  it
emphasized  the  issues  that  met  with  a  wide  international  consensus:  human rights,
release of prisoners, permission to view prisoners, and establishment of an open dialogue
with all of the Cuban citizens.21Not much was achieved beyond the 2004 and 2006 reports
themselves. What has actually happened in Cuba is precisely the ‘succession’ the Bush
administration  wanted  to  avoid  at  all  cost.  Just  like  the  Florida  Cuban  American
community was severely disappointed in 1992 when the collapse of  the Soviet Union
(Cuba’s creditor and main support) failed to entail the much-expected collapse of the
Castro regime, they will probably also have to accept the pace of change that Raúl Castro
will impose, on his own terms. 
 
4. Lifting the Embargo? Human Rights, Trade,
Investment and Travel (2000-2008)
13 The embargo has been in force since 1961 in order to isolate Fidel Castro and possibly
bring about his downfall. It was significantly strengthened by the U.S. Congress in the
post-Cold War years with the Cuban Democracy Act (1992) and the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton Act) of 1996.22Hard-line Cuban Americans and
their most powerful organization at the time, the Cuban American National Foundation,
exerted strong lobbying and, along with their conservative allies in Congress, played an
instrumental role in the adoption of the two texts during the two presidential election
years  of  1992  and  1996.  The  Helms-Burton  Act  was  reluctantly  signed  into  law  by
President Clinton, after two Cuban-American Brothers to the Rescue planes were shot
down by the Cuban Air Force.23 Helms-Burton codifies the Cuban embargo and sets forth a
number of conditions for its suspension which are actually binding to the executive until
new legislation is passed and annuls it. Title III in particular holds any person trafficking
in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government liable to the U.S property-owner.
The “extraterritorial” nature of the law antagonized many foreign countries—traditional
allies such as Canada and Western Europe—and this specific provision was waived after a
few months by both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush.
14 For the past seventeen years the United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly voted
resolutions calling for the embargo to be repealed as soon as possible (the 2008 vote was
in favor of repeal by 185 to 3), but to no avail. In view of the embargo’s poor results, a
variety of American experts, lobbies, and Congressmen are now more and more vocal in
demanding its total or partial lifting. The worst possible threat from Cuba now is no
longer  political  but  more  likely  a  refugee  crisis  caused  by  a  combination  of  lack  of
freedom and economic difficulties.
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15 Yet, this historical change in the bilateral relationship will have to go down a long and
bumpy road. Because of the Helms Burton provisions, a unilateral, presidential decision is
not possible—although executive orders are always a way to get round legislative hurdles
—and these legislative conditions make it difficult  for the United States to have any
leverage as events unfold in Cuba. Officials make it clear: “Congress is pivotal to lift the
embargo.”24Critics of the embargo “maintain that the United States may be unprepared to
deal  with  alternative  scenarios  of  Cuba’s  political  transition.”25 During  the  Bush
Administration, only limited and sector-by-sector openings were occasionally granted.
One of the administration’s last moves in May 2008 consisted in authorizing the shipment
to Cuba of cellphones activated in the United States and prepaid by Cuban emigrants,
while authorizing nongovernmental organizations to send computers to the island if the
Castro government allowed internet access. The intention was both to force Raúl Castro
to keep his promise to open access to cellphones, computers and DVD players, and to
allow Cuban people to communicate freely—ideally a first step toward democracy. 
16 Both the Cuban Democracy Act and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act focus
on “democracy”. Among the conditions set forth by the 1996 law for the suspension of the
embargo, a transition Cuban government should not include Raúl or Fidel Castro, should
legalize  all  political  activity,  release  all  political  prisoners,  establish  an  independent
judiciary, and respect internationally recognized human rights. The latter are clearly a
major issue in the rationale for maintaining the embargo.26 The official U.S. stance, which
is also that of the majority of Cuban Americans, is that there will be no sweeping policy
change as long as Cuba imprisons political opponents and journalists, does not respect
human rights, and does not hold free and internationally supervised elections. In this
respect, the change from Fidel to Raúl has brought about no substantial change as i twas
not a democratic transition. A few prisoners are occasionally released but this is clearly
insufficient to consider Cuba a democracy. The succession from Fidel to Raúl and the
continuation of an authoritarian regime is exactly what the Bush administration wanted
to avoid, but short of outright intervention there is little Washington can do now that
Raúl is officially holding the reins of power. The embargo, as well as the limitations on
travel and remittances, are thus thought to be the only available means to pressure Cuba
into  improving  its  democratic  record.  The  European  stance,  which  is  one  of
accommodation,  of investment  and  tourism  (fostering  contact  between  Cubans  and
foreigners), brings evidence that a more open attitude has not altered political practices




17 The U.S. embargo is not total, however. From the end of the Cold War, many groups have
lobbied Congress and the Executive to open up commercial relations between the two
countries. Spurred on by Pope John Paul II’s condemnation of the embargo (1998) and the
call for more humanitarian aid to Cuba, an array of farm and business groups throughout
the country pressured their senators and representatives at state and federal levels to
pass anti-embargo resolutions and legislation. Established in 1994, the U.S.-Cuba Trade
and Economic Council was one of the most active private organizations in this nationwide
campaign in favor of renewing commercial ties with Cuba, and it played a significant part
in  rallying  some  Republican  members  of  Congress  to  the  anti-embargo  coalition.
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President Clinton announced the partial lifting of some of the sanctions for humanitarian
reasons in 1998, and in 2000 he signed into law the Agriculture Appropriations Bill and
the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Bill allowing the sale of food and
medicines to Cuba. However, these were allowed only under strict conditions which were
initially refused by the Cuban government—notably the obligation to make advance cash
payments for all goods imported from the United States.27 
18 George W. Bush was also under strong pressure from some traditional Republican groups
in  the  business  and  farming  worlds  to  increase  commercial  ties  with  Cuba.  U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba, while restricted to basic products (wheat, chicken, corn,
rice, soybean, beans, lentils, pork and powder milk) have totalled $ 2.7 billion since 2001,
rising from $ 7 million in 2001 to over $ 400 million in 2004. U.S. exports declined in 2005
and 2006 due to competition from China and Venezuela, but according to Department of
Commerce statistics they increased again to $ 447 million in 2007 and a record high of $
718 in 2008, in part because of the rise in food prices and because of Cuba’s food needs in
the aftermath of  several hurricanes.28 The very existence  of  these  exports,  added to
private humanitarian donations, makes it impossible to accuse Washington of starving
the  Cuban  population  and placates  the  agribusiness  lobby  that  still  wants  to  lift
restrictions. Some of the reasons for their somewhat more subdued crusade might be the
significant  growth  of  their  exports,  cash  pre-payments,  and  the  efforts  of  the  pro-
embargo U.S.-Cuba Democracy Political Action Committee to convince key members of
Congress,  largely through campaign donations.29For the hard-line U.S.  Representative
Mario Díaz Balart, “doing business with Cuba is akin to doing business with apartheid-era
South Africa or Nazi Germany.”30
19 In the 109th and 110th Congresses, in a bipartisan effort, an array of Representatives and
Senators  from  both  parties—Baucus,  Delahunt,  Dorgan,  Enzi,  Flake  (Republican
Representative Jeff Flake is particularly active in the fight to turn from the embargo to
free trade), Moran, Rangel, Serrano, and Udall—regularly initiated bills that would lift
restrictions and/or the embargo altogether,  either because they support  agribusiness
lobbies (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American Farm Bureau Federation) or because they
sincerely believe that the embargo has failed to reach its objective and it is time to turn to
a policy of engagement. Their efforts continue in the current 111th Congress. 
 
4.2 Investment and Oil
20 While many U.S. investors are jealous of their European, Canadian, or Latin American
counterparts  who  all  have  investment  activities  in  Cuba,  one  of  the  main  bones  of
contention is the offshore oil sector and the alleged large oil reserves in Cuban waters. So
far Cuba has signed agreements for seven concessions involving foreign oil companies for
the exploration of offshore oil and gas or cooperation with Cuba’s state oil company (from
Spain, Norway, India, Canada, Venezuela, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brazil). China is so far
limited to onshore oil extraction. Oil is such a sensitive sector in times of spiraling prices,
added to the volatility  of  the Middle East,  that  the U.S.  oil  and business  lobbies  are
pushing hard to lift an embargo that prevents them from exploiting the resource right
next door. Several lawmakers, such as former Senator Larry Craig in April 2006, have
attempted to strengtehn their argument by brandishing the Chinese threat:
We sit here watching China exploit a valuable resource within eye-sight of the U.S.
coast. I am certain the American public would be shocked, as this country is trying
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to reduce our dependency on Middle East oil, that countries like China are realizing
this energy resource….We will miss a boat that won't sail twice if we don't allow
U.S. companies to at least explore the possibilities of new supplies in neighboring
countries.31
21 There is clearly a populist touch to such arguments, but beyond the rhetorical turn lies
the growing role of China in Latin America and the admiration some Cuban leaders feel
for  the  Chinese  economic  model.32Although China  is  probably  not  about  to  play  the
fundamental role that the Soviet Union did during the Cold war, it became Cuba’s second
most  important  trading  partner  (after  Venezuela)  in  2005  and  economic  ties  keep
increasing.33 Former Senator Craig’s rhetoric has not been repeated since then and most
experts and U.S. officials dealing with Cuba agree that the Chinese presence in Cuba and
more widely in Latin America is mostly economic and commercial. It does not pose a
significant strategic threat yet,  only close observation. As far as Cuban onshore oil  is
concerned,  they emphasize that it  is  mostly poor quality and years away from being
commercially viable. 
22 The ‘Chinese threat’  in Cuba is not an object of serious preoccupation in Washington
today  as  exemplified  by  only  two  hearings  being  held  in  the  11th  Congress  as  of
September 2009. The latest one, at the time of writing, took place in June 2008 and in his
testimony Daniel Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue only devoted a few sentences to
the China-Cuba relationship, emphasizing the commercial links between the two but also
the disillusion on both sides.34 One thing remains certain, however, and that is that lifting
the embargo would serve both U.S. economic and strategic interests by reducing China’s
influence in the U.S. ‘backyard.’ 
23 Competing pieces  of  legislation were introduced in Congress  with,  on the one hand,
initiatives aiming to allow U.S. companies to work with Cuba,35 which would indirectly
signal the end of the embargo, while on the other hand, punitive initiatives patterned on
Helms-Burton  and  the  imposition  of  sanctions  on  aliens  who  help  Cuba  develop  its
offshore oil resources. However. no action was taken on either of these initiatives. Two
Cuban Americans were involved in the punitive initiatives but the proponents of the
other bills were equally distributed among Democrats and Republicans. This reflects pork
barrel interests much more than party ideology and shows that the Cuban issue clearly
transcends party lines.
 
4.3. Travel and Remittance Restrictions during the George W. Bush
Administration
24 While President Bush was ambiguous about commercial relations with Cuba, trying to
satisfy two competing groups within his own party, he chose to cater to Cuban American
hardliners and adopted a tough stance on travel and remittances. In 2004 (an election
year) trips to Cuba were restricted to once every three years and a 14-day stay, while
remittances were limited to 300 dollars every three months for each household to close
family members only (parents, brothers, sisters, and children). The underlying rationale
—hardly different from the Clinton Administration’s in 199436—was that when they visit
their  relatives on the island,  Cuban Americans bring along money and presents  that
soften the harshest aspects of living in Cuba, thus postponing a possible rebellion and
indirectly contributing to financing the dictatorship. The same goes for remittances. The
idea was thus to strengthen this part of the embargo while softening a little the part
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affecting U.S. businessmen. The problem is that the measure angered a majority of Cuban
Americans who, beyond ideology, would like to help their relatives in Cuba and see them
as often as possible, just like any other immigrants.
25 In December 2006, about twenty moderate Cuban American associations, including the
Cuba Study Group, the Christian Democratic Party of Cuba, andthe CANF, supported by
dissidents in Cuba, gathered under an umbrella association, Consenso Cubano, to request
the  easing  of  restrictions  on  travel  and  remittances.  Hurricanes  Gustav  and  Ike,
devastating large parts of Cuba in the late summer of 2008, prompted renewed pressure
by these  organizations  and in  Congress  to  lift  travel  and remittance  restrictions  for
humanitarian reasons. Legislation was introduced by Senator Lugar and Representative
Berman to this end. Representative Delahunt held a subcommittee hearing in September
200837 to emphasize the existing restrictions’ inhumane aspects. Francisco Hernández,
president of the CANF, was one of the Cuban and Cuban American voices pleading in favor
of lifting restrictions, a far cry from the foundation’s highly confrontational attitude in its
early days. Although it died at the end of the congressional adjournment a few months
later, this piece of legislation is just one example among a growing number of bipartisan
congressional efforts to modify the legislative framework of the bilateral relationship.
Such efforts paved the way for President Obama’s new policy on Cuban American travel
and remittances which will be detailed below.
 
4.4 Washington’s Policy toward Cuba under Scrutiny
26 Prodded by Congressmen and free-trade lobbies, various government studies and audits
have  denounced  the  failings  of  Washington’s  Cuban  policy.  A  2007  Government
Accountability  Office  (GAO)  report  highlighted  the  problems  raised  by  competing
priorities in enforcing the embargo on Cuba, and its negative consequences for the fight
against more serious threats by straining
Customs  and  Border  Protection’s  ability  to  carry  out  its  mission  of  keeping
terrorists,  criminals,  and  other  inadmissible  aliens  from  entering  the  country.
Moreover,  after 2001,  Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) opened
more investigations and imposed more penalties for embargo violations, such as
buying Cuban cigars, than for violations of other sanctions, such as those on Iran.38 
27 Representatives Flake (Republican) and Delahunt (Democrat), who chair a Working Group
on Cuba in the House of Representatives, are among the most determined Congressmen in
their attacks on the embargo and the current Cuba policy. Their bipartisan association is
most  interesting as  it  covers  a  variety of  interests:  the West  (Arizona)  for  Flake the
Republican free-trader, New England for Delahunt the liberal. They requested an audit
from the Government Accountability Office which, in November 2006, disclosed serious
dysfunctional activities in the Agency for International Development’s (AID) Cuban Aid
Program.39 A second report, issued in November 2008, acknowledged the steps taken to
improve oversight of the assistance but maintained that it was insufficient.40 The CANF
further charged that a majority of the assistance for Cuba had not been spent in direct aid
to Cuban civil society.41
28 Representatives Flake and Delahunt also intended to question the relevance of continued
U.S.  government  funding  for  Radio  (since  1983)  and  TV  Marti  (since  1989),  initially
launched as an extension of the concept that started with Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty in the early days of  the Cold War.  The official  goals  of  these media were to
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“provide [the Cuban people with] a reliable source of information....provide news and
analysis that is not manipulated by the state but is objective, accurate, credible, relevant
and timely” while vigorously denying any intention of “broadcast[ing] propaganda or
provocations....[of inciting] a desire within the Cuban people to leave their country....[or
of inciting] Cubans to revolt against their own society.”42 Radio and TV Marti are now
broadcast from airborne platforms and no longer from U.S. soil, but the reception of TV
Marti and, consequently, its impact on the Cuban population is still very weak due to
continued jamming by Cuban authorities. The results of this “media incursion” have been
so disappointing over the past twenty years that these taxpayer-funded programs are
increasingly seen as antiquated organizations of a by-gone era and an unnecessary gift to
the most extreme Cuban exiles. They have been repeatedly under attack in Congress, but
to no avail so far. An investigation was conducted in 2007 by the State Department and
the Broadcasting Board of Governors’s Office of the Inspector General, but this only led to
the  continuation  of  the  programs  and  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Office  of  Cuba
Broadcasting  (OCB)  had  significantly  improved  its  operations.  Some  $  35  million  is
granted  to  the  OCB  every  year.  At  the  prompting  of  Delahunt  and  Flake,  the  GAO
undertook its own investigation and the subsequent report in July 2008 was much less
positive. Another report issued in 2009 confirmed that Radio and TV Marti’s audience was
still very small (2 percent).43 These findings have paved the way for continued attacks on
these Cold War programs. 
 
5. The 2008 Elections and the Cuban Issue
5.1 An Unprecedented Congressional Battle in Miami
29 The three Florida Republican Cuban American Representatives to the U.S. Congress were
facing unprecedented challenges in the 2008 elections. Prior to 2002, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(first  elected  in  1989)  and  Lincoln  Diaz  Balart  (first  elected  in  1992)  were  almost
systematically unopposed. It was as if the 18th and 21st districts of Florida belonged to
them.  Lincoln’s  brother,  Mario,  joined  the  duo  in  2002  and was  unopposed in  2004.
Opposition to the three of them grew in 2006, however, and the trend intensified in 2008
with three Democratic Latinos challenging them. Moreover, the challengers to Lincoln
and Mario Diaz Balart were influential Cuban-born Americans: Raul Martinez was mayor
of Hialiah from 1981 to 2005 while Joe Garcia is a former Miami-Dade Democratic Party
Chairman as well as a former top CANF official, which speaks volumes about the political
shifts  within  this  organization.  Both  of  them emphasized  non-Cuban  issues  in  their
campaigns, with the economic crisis actually pushing the Castros into the background. In
the two months preceding the election, none of the candidates, whether Democratic or
Republican, mentioned Cuba or its leaders, thus making the campaign more ‘American’.
30 Although there was still a Republican majority among registered voters in South Florida,
the number of Democrats and Independents significantly increased. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
faced another woman, Annette Taddeo, who is half-Colombian, half-Italian, but her seat
was considered safe. The Democratic Party only targeted the Diaz-Balart brothers’ seats
as possible gains in November 2008.
31 The staunch anti-Castro Republicans went on to win reelection by fairly large margins. It
is always difficult to unseat incumbents, but the 2008 campaign nevertheless signals that
a different approach to politics is developing within the Cuban-American community,
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proving that it can produce different brands of politician and will not cling forever to its
traditional hard-line stance toward Cuba. It also signals a gradual shift from Cubans as
‘exiles’ to full ‘American’ citizens.
32 Surprisingly, even if they had been elected, those Democratic candidates would not have
been seeking an end to the almost half-a-century old embargo, at least not completely or
immediately.  Both  Martinez  and  Garcia  made  it  clear  that  they  wanted  to  ease
restrictions on Cubans who seek to visit or send money to relatives in Cuba, and that they
wanted to cut funding to U.S. government funded Radio and TV Marti. But they did not
envision an end to the embargo. Although Garcia recognized that it had been a failure, he
added that it was “a moral position,” a “religious creed.” “The good thing about a creed is
that you don’t have to prove it. The problem with a creed is, how do you change it?”44 
 
5.2. Presidential Candidates and Cuba
33 Among  the  presidential  candidates,  the  policy  to  be  adopted  toward  Cuba  was  also
debated. Senator McCain showed no ambiguity and clearly supported the continuation of
restrictive measures and the embargo, in other words a continuation of the Bush policy.
The CANF was ignored when he visited Florida and several Republican representatives
chose to speak on Ninoska Pérez Castellon’s radio show. As for the Democrats, caution
was just as obvious among the presidential candidates as among the local Democratic
contenders: if there was a consensus on easing travel and money transfers and increasing
exports to Cuba, neither Senator Clinton nor Senator Obama mentioned the lifting of the
embargo. In his Miami speech in front of the CANF on May 23, 2008, Senator Obama did
promise that he would immediately lift the bans on family travel to Cuba and the limits
on remittances, but the overall message was clear: 
I will maintain the embargo. It provides us with the leverage to present the regime
with a clear choice: If you take significant steps toward democracy, beginning with
the  freeing  of  all  political  prisoners,  we  will  take  steps  to  begin  normalizing
relations.  That’s  the way to bring about real  change in Cuba—through a strong,
smart and principled diplomacy.45 
34 Thus,  the “embargo as  leverage”—whether justifiable or  not—appeared as  the lowest
common denominator with all candidates.
35 The reason is straightforward: lifting the embargo immediately would still be political
suicide in South Florida. It would antagonize the still very active, powerful and voting
older generation (now less than 10 percent of South Florida’s 800,000 residents of Cuban
descent), and no one wants to run the risk of infuriating them. More than at any other
time, the gap between numbers and influence is widening. The Miami-based Democratic
pollster, Bendixen & Associates, emphasized that more than 85 percent of the older exiles
who oppose any concessions are registered to vote, compared with 18 percent of the
post-1980 arrivals.46Moreover, Cuba is not such a hot issue today that it is worth taking
political risks to change the current policy. To wit, although several bills were introduced
in  Congress  in  2008  to  lift  part  of  the  embargo,  none  went  through  the  whole
congressional  process  to  be  submitted to  the  President  for  approval,  in  spite  of  the
Democratic majority in both Houses. The Democratic leadership did not push them and
the 2008 Democratic Senate leader, Harry Reid of Nevada, supported a tough line on Cuba.
In  other  words,  although  the  strongly  Democratic  Congress  that  emerged  from  the
November 2008 elections might be in a better position to adopt sweeping change, the
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Democratic party does not have a common stand on the issue and, apart from symbolic




6.1. Evolution of the Cuban American Community
36 The open debates taking place both in Washington and, for the first time in many years,
in Miami, signal that hard-liners are no longer the only influence on Washington’s Cuban
policy. Although still active and powerful, their block is aging and losing power. Many
other  groups,  including  dissenting  voices  within  the  Cuban  American  community,
contribute to a policy that is not only driven by strategic considerations but by an array
of  interests  ranging  from  “guts”  to  the  bluntly  economic.  The  Cuban  American
community has never been monolithic but it is becoming more and more diverse: those
who came to the United States at a very young age, who were born in the U.S. or came in
later  waves   (300,000 have  come  from Cuba  in  the  past  ten  years  and  are  blatantly
apolitical),  feel  more  American  citizens  than  Cuban  exiles  and  are  more  open  to
normalization, or tend to view the relationship from an immigrant angle and not through
the  lens  of  ideology.  The  reason  why  they  came  also  makes  a  difference:  political
opponents to the Castro regime, even if they came recently, tend to favor a harder line
than those who came for economic reasons, which covers the vast majority of immigrants
to the United States. 
37 There is obviously a generational aspect to shifts occurring within the Cuban American
community. Associated with this is a demographic shift in Florida, where a majority of
Latinos in the state are now non-Cubans. Beyond the 41 percent Florida Latinos that are
of  Cuban descent,  what  indeed is  striking  is  the  growing share  of  other  Latinos:  17
percent are of Mexican origin, 13 percent of South American origin and 18 percent are
Puerto Rican. If Cubans still muster a small majority in Miami-Dade, their influence is
increasingly diluted statewide. This is bound to have an impact on politics in the near
future as increasing numbers of recently arrived Cubans and other Latinos become U.S.
citizens and have a say in their new country’s political life and foreign policy options.
38 Although Obama won 57 percent of the Latino vote in the state (as opposed to 56 percent
for Bush in 2004)—an unprecedented figure for a Democratic candidate since the first exit
polling of Hispanics in 198847—he only received 35 percent of the Cuban American vote in
the strongly Cuban districts of Miami Dade (a 10 percent increase over John Kerry in
2004)  where George W.  Bush gained 78 percent in 2004.48According to exit  polls,  the
generational difference was stark: 84 percent of Miami-Dade Cuban-American voters 65
or older backed McCain, while 55 percent of those 29 or younger backed Obama.49 Of the
800  Cuban  Americans  polled  in  November  2008  in  Miami-Dade  by  the  Florida
International  University (FIU),  51 percent of  the 18-44 age group said they voted for
Obama while only 20 percent in the 65 and older group did.50 All age groups combined, 38
percent  of  the  respondents  had voted for  Obama.  But  does  it  really  matter?  Obama
carried Florida and its 27 electors with only a minority of the Cuban American vote, a
clear signal that times are changing and that this ethnic vote is no longer so crucial for
carrying the state.
Washington-Miami-Havana 1999-2009: Towards the End of a Ménage à Trois?
European journal of American studies, Vol 4, No 2 | 2009
12
39 Cubans in Florida only make up 34 percent of Florida’s Hispanic registered voters today,
down from 46 percent in 1990, losing ground even in Miami, and the non-Cuban Latinos
have developed a severe aversion to “exile politics” as it was practiced until recently.
Moreover, as emphasized by the Center for Responsive Politics,51 although a majority of
funds are still donated to Republicans for presidential elections, Cuban Americans now
tend to distribute their donations between Republicans and Democrats. Times are indeed
changing.
40 As far as  the attitude toward Cuba is  concerned,  FIU polls  conducted in Miami-Dade
County  since  1991  signal  clear  changes  in  recent  years  and  emphasize  significant
differences among age categories and the various ‘decades of arrival’ groups. Bendixen
also has come to underline generational and ‘decade of arrival’ gaps in Cuban American
public opinion on the embargo issue.52For instance, 65 percent of the respondents favored
a dialogue with the Cuban government in 2007, as opposed to 40 percent in 1991 (FIU
poll).  57.5  percent  favored the continuation of  the embargo in 2007,  dropping to  45
percent in 2008 (the lowest figure since the FIU poll was first conducted in 1991), while
only 23 percent think the embargo works (21 percent in 2008). The gap between those
who think the embargo works and those who favor its continuation—24 percent in 2008—
is the key to understanding the essence of Cuban American opinion. It is clear that the
embargo does not work, so it comes down to emotion, symbolism, and the feeling that if
the hard-line is abandoned the Castros will have won the 47-year struggle. In the words of
sociologist Guillermo Grenier, “the emotional basis of the exile ideology is what makes
Cubans in the United States take positions that others judge to be irrational.…It is a story
of frustration, misunderstandings, and resentment.”53 In the 18-44 age category, only 35
percent favor continuing the embargo as opposed to 68 percent in the 65 and older group.
Bendixen confirmed these findings in April 2009, with 42 percent of Cubans interviewed
nationwide favorable to a continuation of the embargo, against 43 percent opposed to it.
41 28.7 percent would like to return to Cuba if political change occurred, down from 32
percent in 2004, but the percentage has more or less remained around 30 percent since
1991, which proves the desire of the vast majority of Cuban Americans to stay in the
United States, and probably explains their shift to a focus on more American issues. 66
percent favored unrestricted travel in 2008 (up from 55 percent in 2007), the highest
figure  ever.  Furthermore,  in  2008 65  percent  favored ending restrictions  on sending
money to Cuba, thus signaling both a departure from high politics and ideology and a
desire  to  focus  on  personal  interests  (visits  to  family) and  to  purely  “immigrant”
interests. After President Obama’s announcement in April 2009, the Bendixen poll found a
67 percent majority supporting the lifting of travel restrictions for all Americans, with
about  240,000  adults  of  Cuban  origin  saying  they  would  like  to  travel  to  Cuba  in
2009-2010.
42 The 2008 FIU Transition Poll also reported a 79 percent majority in favor of direct talks
with  Cuba  about  migration,  as  well  as  a  65  percent  majority  favorable  to  the  U.S.
reestablishing diplomatic  relations with Havana.  Interestingly enough,  the traditional
questions on support for a U.S. invasion of Cuba, an invasion by exiles, or a return to Cuba
disappeared from the shorter 2008 poll.
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6.2 President Obama’s Overtures
43 It was one of his campaign promises, and President Obama fulfilled it in April 2009 a few
days before the Summit of the Americas. Congress had already taken a first step towards
easing restrictions on family travel to Cuba in March (reverting to the pre-2004 period),
as  part  of  an  Omnibus  appropriations  measure.  The  White  House  gave the  initial
congressional move a more lasting turn. Among other provisions, Cuban Americans are
now allowed unlimited family visits and remittances, a significant change from the 2004
legislation that pleased a large majority of the community and which had been supported
by the CANF and the Florida Cuban American Democratic candidates to the 2008 U.S.
legislative election. One of them, Joe Garcia, helped draft the new measures. The 2004
restrictions failed to produce any change in Cuba, and allowing Cuban Americans to visit
and send money to their families as often as they wished now came to be seen as no more
than a humane measure. 
44 The move, however, faced strong opposition from the three Florida Cuban American U.S.
Representatives as well as from Senator Menéndez, a Democrat from New Jersey. This
opposition underlines a growing gap between the community majority and its leaders in
the U.S. Congress, whether Republican or Democrat, who cling to a more radical posture
towards Cuba. It is probably not insignificant to note in that respect that out of the six
Cuban American Congressmen and Senators  in  office  in  2009,  five  were  Cuban-born,
making their relation to the island and the Castro regime very personal. Only Senator
Menéndez, the son of Cuban immigrants, was born in the U.S. The Obama Administration
was  particularly  criticized  for  not  seeking  concessions  from  Havana—in  particular
democratic reforms and the release of political prisoners—in exchange for the flood of
dollars that is bound to reach the island, thus indirectly helping prop up the “Cuban
dictatorship”.
45 The other measures announced by the White House press secretary—and not by President
Obama himself—have not triggered as much debate. U.S. telecommunications companies
will  be  allowed  to  pursue  licensing  agreements  in  Cuba,  in  an  attempt  to  open  up
communications there by increasing access to cellphones and satellite television. The list
of items allowed to be sent to Cuba as gift parcels has also been expanded, including
clothing, personal hygiene items, soap-making and fishing equipment.
46 The  “measured  approach”  chosen  by  the  Obama  administration  targets  areas  that
represent fundamental freedoms and aims to diminish restrictions on normal citizens.54
Strategically speaking it is an accommodatory gesture that is bound to please the Latin
American  leaders  throughout  the  continent,  but  it  does  call  for  some  reciprocity,
particularly the lifting of the fees charged by the Cuban government on all remittances.
The idea is clearly to extend a hand to the Cuban leaders, to entice them to conduct
democratic changes, not by retribution but through a revived soft power. The ultimate
goal has not changed, however. “Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Cuba” is
still  the  title  of  the  White  House  Memorandum.  Only  the  means  to  achieve  it  have
changed.
The promotion of democracy and human rights in Cuba is in the national interest of
the United States and is  a key component of  this  Nation's foreign policy in the
Americas. Measures that decrease dependency of the Cuban people on the Castro
regime and that promote contacts between Cuban-Americans and their relatives in
Cuba are means to encourage positive change in Cuba. The United States can pursue
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these goals by facilitating greater contact between separated family members in the
United States and Cuba and increasing the flow of remittances and information to
the Cuban people.55 
47 In order to engage the Cuban government in ways it  would engage any country (for
instance  on  migration  or  counternarcotics),56 the  U.S.  administration  also  reopened
migration talks with the Cubans, which had been suspended in 2004. They first met in July
2009 and will meet again before the end of the year. Another sign of engagement with the
Cuban government was the presidential decision not to meet with the representative of
Cuban dissidents who came to Washington, D.C. to pick up the award granted by the
National Endowment for Democracy. It was the first time in five years that the President
had not met with the winner of the Democracy Award, and this decision—which triggered
much Cuban American anger—was clearly  intended to  avoid antagonizing the Cuban
leaders. Similarly the language on Cuba in the annual State Department terrorism report
was more muted, and the much criticized Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba was
discontinued, responsibility for Cuban Affairs returning to the State Department’s Office
of Cuban Affairs. These do not imply drastic policy changes, but they certainly represent
strong symbolic moves.
48 At the same time, using language virtually identical to that of George W. Bush in his first
waiver,  President Obama informed Congress that  he would waive for six months the
provision  contained  in  the  Helms-Burton  Act  that  permits  lawsuits  against  foreign
companies that use Cuban property once owned by Americans.  Opposed by the most
radical  Cuban  American  groups  but  fully  supported  by  the  European  Union,  Obama
reiterated that the waiver is necessary for U.S. national interests and its policy toward
Cuba.
49 In June 2009, the Latin American OAS members pushed to reintegrate Cuba into their
organization. Both Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and congressmen made it clear that
Cuba  should  release  political  prisoners  and  establish  human  rights  and  democratic
reforms before the  United States  would support  Cuba’s reentry.  In  the U.S.  House of
Representatives,  legislation was introduced by Connie Mack (R,  Fla),  supported by all
Cuban American members, to withhold U.S. funding from the OAS if Cuba was readmitted
as a member. Finally the OAS members were pressured to agree to reintegrate Cuba only
on the condition of significant democratic improvements. 
50 So far all these overtures have not been reciprocated by the Cuban leaders: Fidel Castro
repeated that the trade embargo as a whole should be lifted. No political prisoners have
been released, restrictions on travelling are unchanged, and Havana maintains stringent
restrictions on opposition figures. In other words, so far the Cuban leaders have made no
gestures  of  good-will  or  moves  in  the  direction  of  human  rights  or democracy.  In
addition,  the Cuban government responded to the OAS that  it  was  not  interested in
rejoining the regional organization.  
51 There has been a lot of guessing about whether the lifting of travel restrictions would be
extended to academics, students and all U.S. citizens, and whether the April move would
soon lead to the end of the embargo. The anti-embargo coalition vows to push in that
direction but although the President can do a lot and strip the embargo legislation of
some of its main features, Congress is the one that can alter legislation, and there does
not seem to be a majority to act any time soon. The “measured approach” chosen by the
Obama administration is simultaneously too much for the Cuban American hard-liners
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and not enough for a growing number of Cuban Americans and policy makers. In a July
27, 2009, interview, President Obama deflated these expectations:
We're not there yet. We think it's important to see progress on issues of political
liberalization,  freedom  of  the  press,  freedom  of  assembly,  release  of  political
prisoners in order for there to be the full possibility of normalization between our
two countries. We're taking it step by step, seeing if, as we change some of the old
approaches that we've been taking, we are seeing some movement on the Cuban
government side. I  don't think it's going to be happening overnight.  I  think it's
going to be a work in progress.57 
52 In saying this, Obama put the ball more than ever in Havana’s court.
 
7. Conclusion
53 Gradually, more and more Cuban Americans cease being “exiles” to become, like other
immigrants  and  their  descendants,  like  the  vast  majority  of  Americans,  hyphenated
citizens  who  tend  to  focus  more  on  economic  and  social  issues  than  on  an  old
international  feud.  Education,  the  cost  of  living,  jobs,  and  health  care  have  become
priorities for all Latinos, including those of Cuban descent. The current economic crisis
has significantly increased this tendency among working class and middle class Cuban
Americans. Recent surveys have emphasized a generational divide as most polls break
down data by age groups and ‘decades of arrival’  groups to substantiate the growing
ideological gap between the younger generation or those arrived more recently and the
senior generation who keep focusing on regime change in Cuba. The combination of all
this data offers a more detailed picture of the Miami-Dade County Cuban Americans’
heterogeneity.
54 Evidence of this shift was clear in the last weeks of the 2008 campaign, when none of the
Miami candidates tackled the Castro or even the Cuba issue. This is also reflected in the
CANF’s  ideological  evolution.  The former ‘die-hard’  organization is  now advocating a
more pragmatic policy and has sided with very liberal elements of the Democratic party
to plead in favor of lifting travel and remittance restrictions. The pattern of influence
pattern is consequently not as clearcut as it was in the 1980s. Other groups such as the
Cuban American Democracy PAC have become more vocal than CANF in their defense of a
confrontational policy. 
55 Change will be minimal as long as a handful of Cuban Americans, afraid that “the policy
train will bypass Miami and head straight for Havana,”58 continue to enjoy an outsized
political influence synonymous with their own political survival,  and as long as there
exist other much more pressing foreign policy issues for Washington. 
56 Change  will  certainly  come  but  through  a  gradual  process,  once  normalization  is
acceptable to all, both in the United States and in Cuba, once realpolitik finally prevails
over emotion and the convenient ménage à trois (Cuba, Washington and the Miami Cuban
American community),  which has  functioned for  almost  half  a  century,  ceases  to  be
attractive to the protagonists themselves. The embargo will become obsolete because it
will eventually no longer be necessary to preserve the status quo of Cubans in America as
political  exiles.59 Cuba  itself  has  obviously  a  fundamental  role  to  play  in  this.  The
international communist menace is history now and if the Cuban regime improves its
human rights record, which is now why it is regularly condemned by Washington, the
very ground for ostracizing the island will disappear. Many U.S. experts have repeatedly
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called for the end of the “ideology of benevolent domination,”60 a reassessment of U.S.
national interests, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the means employed so far, and a
more pragmatic policy towards Cuba. To quote but a few: “The objective should be to
normalize  the  U.S.-Cuban  relationship  as  quickly  as  possible.  It is  only  through
normalization that the United States can most quickly achieve our goals and remove this
needless irritant from our list of global concerns;”61 “Wanted: A Logical Cuba Policy.…in
terms of concrete U.S. interests, Cuba is of little importance to the United States;”62 “The
United States should adopt a policy of critical and constructive engagement, phased-in
unilaterally;”63 “Changing  policy  toward  Cuba  is  strongly  in  the  American  national
interest.”64 
57 The conclusion of this almost half-a-century old story is that U.S. influence in Cuba is
very  limited.  Everything  has  been  tried,  from  charm  to  pressure  to  retribution.65
Conditions in Cuba have not changed in any way. The Washington Post editorialist Eugene
Robinson put it in a nutshell: “People, we have no leverage in Cuba.” In Washington, in
Miami,  and  in  Havana,  the  time  has  come  for  a  pragmatic  reappraisal  of  a  highly
emotional relationship.66
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ABSTRACTS
Although comparatively  recent immigrants  and a  very  small  group of  hardly  more  than 1.3
million,  Cuban  Americans  have  been  very  influential  in  Washington’s  confrontational  policy
toward Cuba over the past thirty years. While the end of the Cold War should have undermined
the rationale for the embargo, they maintained a hard line on Cuba and proved quite convincing
in their arguments with both the Clinton and the George W. Bush Administrations. This piece
focuses on the past decade and will explore Washington’s continuing hard line toward Cuba as
well as the serious challenges this posture is facing today. Increasing pressure from competing
powerful lobbies to end the embargo, a growing uneasiness in Congress with the policy’s failure,
a  severe split  within the Republican party over  the issue,  and a  declining radicalism among
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younger Cuban Americans and more recent Cuban immigrants, all  tend to signal a change in
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